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What can fertility indicators tell us about 




The identification and implementation of ways to avert the adverse future 
consequences of rapid population ageing represent urgent new public policy 
challenges. This paper synthesises the available knowledge on pronatalist policy 
options and assesses their potential impact by examining three fertility indicators: 
the total fertility rate, the tempo-adjusted total fertility rate and the personal ideal 
family size. Using recent data from thirteen European countries, the TFR is found 
to be lower than the ideal family size in each population. The two main reasons 
for this gap are tempo effects and economic, social and biological obstacles to the 
implementation of reproductive preferences. These factors together are estimated 
to average approximately 0.8 to 0.9 births per woman. Policy options to raise 
fertility without interfering with existing reproductive preferences are proposed. 
The concluding section briefly examines the impact of an increase in fertility on 
future trends in the old-age dependency ratio. 
 
 
1  Introduction 
Europe faces an unprecedented demographic future. Very low fertility and rising 
life expectancy are leading to a shrinking labour force and a rapidly ageing 
population. These trends have a range of adverse social and economic effects 
which include reduced growth in standards of living and a rise in pension and 
health care costs (OECD 1998, 2001, 2006; United Nations 2007a; World Bank 
1994). Expenditures by widely implemented pay-as-you-go public pensions, 
which rely on transfers from younger to older generations, are becoming 
increasingly burdensome on the contributors as old-age ‘dependency rates’ rise to 
record levels. The European Commission’s White Paper The demographic future 
of Europe—from challenge to opportunity (2006) concluded that “…  public 
finances risk becoming unsustainable in many countries, thereby compromising 
the future equilibrium of pension and social security systems in general. Allowing 
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public spending linked to ageing to create budget deficits would lead to an 
intolerable spiral of debt” (p.7). A study by the International Monetary Fund 
suggests that failure to address these fiscal stresses in pension systems “could 
inflict serious macroeconomic and structural damage, both on the domestic 
economy and, in the case of large industrial countries through international 
linkages, on the world economy” (Chand and Jaeger 1996, p.1). 
Under these changing demographic conditions, identifying and implementing 
ways to reform public support systems for the elderly have become urgent new 
challenges for public policy. A range of options is under consideration: reduced 
benefits, increased taxes, higher labour force participation, delayed retirement, 
privatisation of pension systems, etc. Until recently, demographic options, and in 
particular pronatalist measures, have been largely absent from this debate. Of 
course, most governments in the developed world already have policies that 
provide families with certain benefits, but these are in general not explicitly 
pronatalist. Governments have avoided pronatalist policies for several reasons: a 
reluctance to interfere in the family decision making on such a private matter, a 
lack of urgency, a hope that low fertility will reverse itself, the potential high cost 
of intervention, and uncertainty about its effectiveness. In addition, it is awkward 
to implement pronatalist measures at home while supporting programmes to 
reduce fertility in developing countries. Possible measures to raise fertility include 
fiscal benefits for families with children, as well as measures to assist working 
parents with free or subsidised daycare, flexible hours, leave options, etc. An 
important but still unresolved question is whether pronatalist policies can have a 
significant fertility impact. Assessments of past efforts differ: Demeny (2003) 
finds their effects “at best limited” (p.760), and Van de Kaa (2006) concludes that 
“[f]ertility is largely beyond government control” (p.204). But Calot (2006) 
argues that family policies can raise fertility substantially in the short run and by 
“a few tenths of a child per woman” (p.154) in the long run, which would be 
sufficient to “obtain simple replacement fertility in Western Europe” (p.154). 
Other analysts have positions that fall between these extremes (e.g. Caldwell et al. 
2002; Gauthier 2007; McDonald 2006).  
  This paper presents a synthesis of available knowledge on general 
pronatalist policy options and assesses the potential impact of such policies using 
widely available fertility indicators. The analysis will be confined to data from 
Europe. The first section describes the three main indicators used in the analysis 
and their strength and weaknesses. This is followed by a discussion of policy 
options to raise fertility without interfering with existing reproductive 
preferences. A concluding section briefly examines the impact of an increase in 
fertility on population ageing. John Bongaarts  41 
2  Fertility Indicators  
A range of fertility indicators are available to monitor fertility trends and to 
analyse their determinants. Some are simple to calculate and readily available 
(e.g. crude birth rate and total fertility rate) while others are complex and highly 
demanding of detailed data which are not available for many countries (e.g. life 
table based measures requiring data on births by age, parity and/or duration since 
last birth). Policy makers prefer simple indicators that are easy to interpret and the 
choice of indicators for policy assessment should reflect these interests. The 
present study will rely on the following three indicators of fertility preferences 
and behaviour:  
-Total Fertility Rate (TFR) equals the average life-time number of births per 
woman implied by current age-specific birth rates. It is the most widely used and 
available indicator of fertility quantum observed in a time period (typically a 
year). This measure appears to be easy to interpret because it is expressed in 
births per woman, but there is an inherent complexity of this indicator that is 
hidden for many users. The TFR is a hypothetical measure for a synthetic cohort, 
which is readily misinterpreted by the public and non-demographers. For 
example, media accounts often interpret the TFR as the “the number of births 
women are having”. As discussed below, this cohort interpretation is not an 
accurate one since the TFR often provides a distorted view of the underlying 
behaviour of cohorts when the timing of births changes.  
-Tempo-adjusted total fertility rate (ATFR) is a variant of the TFR designed to 
remove the distorting effect on the TFR of changes in the timing of childbearing. 
It is a pure period quantum measure estimating the TFR that would have been 
observed in the absence of timing changes. The difference between the TFR and 
the  ATFR is called a tempo effect or distortion. The ATFR also equals the 
(constant) TFR that would be observed in the future if fertility conditions and the 
shape of the fertility schedule by age were to remain fixed. To calculate the 
ATFR, the procedure proposed by Bongaarts and Feeney (1998, 2006) will be 
used here because it is relatively undemanding of data and can therefore be 
applied to many countries. An alternative, more complex method has been 
developed by Kohler and Ortega (2002), but it is not clear which method is more 
accurate (Sobotka 2003). Sobotka (2008) uses the Bongaarts-Feeney method and 
states, “[g]iven the limited data availability for computing more sophisticated 
indicators, I consider this indicator a reasonably good approximation of fertility 
quantum, especially when summarised for longer time periods”. The present 
study relies on five-year averages of the TFR and ATFR calculated by Sobotka 
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-Ideal family size (IFS) is the most widely used preference indicator
1. 
Estimates of IFS derived from surveys are sensitive to the wording of the relevant 
questions posed in the survey. In particular, some questions measure the 
respondent’s view of what a desired family size would be for society while other 
questions aim to elicit the family size desired by the individual. To avoid 
confusion, the 2001 round of the Eurobarometer survey asked two questions on 
family size ideals: “Generally speaking, what do you think is the ideal number of 
children for a family?” and “…  for you personally, what would be the ideal 
number of children for a family?” (Goldstein et al. 2003). The analysis presented 
below draws on estimates of IFS obtained from women aged 20-34 using this last 
question.  
It should be noted that none of these indicators measure the actual 
childbearing of women over their lifetimes. Indicators of cohort fertility are of 
course available and the simplest of these is the cohort completed fertility rate 
which equals the average number of births per woman at the end of the 
childbearing years. This is an unambiguous measure of the quantum of fertility 
but it has an important drawback: it does not provide information on fertility 
behaviour during recent years because the childbearing of cohorts is spread over 
several decades in the past. Period measures such the TFR and ATFR avoid this 
problem, if at the cost of introducing a conceptual complexity—in particular the 
tempo distortion—which does not exist for cohort measures.  
Estimates of the TFR and ATFR for 1995-2000 for 26 European countries are 
presented in Table  1 (Sobotka 2004). The (unweighted) averages of these 
estimates equal 1.50 and 1.78 birth per woman, respectively. Fertility varies 
substantially among countries with the TFR ranging from 1.17 in Latvia to 2.06 in 
Iceland and the ATFR ranging from 1.46 in Spain to 2.34 in Iceland. For a 
subgroup of 13 countries, estimates of IFS from the Eurobarometer survey are 
also available (last column of Table 1). In this subgroup, the IFS averaged 2.21 
births per woman with a range from 1.7 in Austria and West Germany to 2.5 in 
England and Wales, Finland, France and Ireland. No attempt will be made here to 
summarise the extensive literature on the social, economic, institutional, 
biological and policy causes of variation in fertility and preferences among 
European countries (see Andersson and Neyer 2004; Caldwell and Schindlmayr 
2003; Frejka et al. 2008; Kohler et al. 2006; Morgan and Taylor 2006; McDonald 
2000; Sobotka 2008). 
                                                 
1   Another widely used preference indicator is expected family size, calculated as the number of 
children the respondent has at the time of the survey plus any additional births wanted in the 
future. Expected family size is usually lower than ideal family size (Goldstein et al. 2003). This 
measure is not used in the present analysis because it combines actual and intended 
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Table 1: 
Observed and tempo adjusted TFR 1995-2000 for 26 countries and ideal family size 













Austria   1.36  1.58  0.22  1.7 
Bulgaria   1.20  1.48  0.28   
Czech Republic    1.18  1.73  0.55   
Denmark   1.79  2.04  0.25  2.4 
England and Wales    1.71  1.85  0.14  2.5 
Estonia   1.28  1.77  0.49   
Finland   1.75  1.89  0.14  2.5 
France   1.79  1.96  0.17  2.5 
Greece   1.30  1.63  0.33  2.3 
Hungary   1.44  1.76  0.32   
Iceland   2.06  2.34  0.28   
Ireland   1.89  2.18  0.29  2.5 
Italy   1.21  1.64  0.43  2.1 
Latvia   1.17  1.55  0.38   
Lithuania   1.40  1.65  0.25   
Macedonia   1.91  2.13  0.22   
Netherlands   1.60  1.73  0.13  2.1 
Norway   1.85  2.07  0.22   
Poland   1.48  1.76  0.28   
Portugal   1.47  1.73  0.26  2.0 
Romania   1.31  1.52  0.21   
Slovakia   1.40  1.74  0.34   
Slovenia   1.26  1.68  0.42   
Spain   1.18  1.46  0.28  2.0 
Sweden   1.57  1.85  0.28  2.4 
West Germany (former FRG)    1.38  1.51  0.13  1.7 
Average 26 countries    1.50  1.78  0.28   
Average 13 countries with 
ideal family size estimate   1.54  1.77  0.23  2.21 
Sources: Sobotka 2004, Goldstein et al. 2003. 
 
All these fertility indicators are subject to measurement error. The TFR is 
usually quite accurate because vital registration is virtually complete in European 
countries, but the tempo-adjusted TFR contains a potential error if the 
assumptions on which the adjustment is based do not hold or if small errors exist 
in estimates of the mean age at childbearing. In addition, the reported personal 
ideal family size may be influenced by the views of others and survey-based 
estimates contain inevitable sampling errors. Figure 1 plots country estimates of 
these three indicators along the vertical axis and cohort fertility along the What can fertility indicators tell us about pronatalist policy options?  44 
horizontal axis. Cohort fertility is estimated for women born around 1970 who 
reached their peak childbearing years in 1995-2000 (Council of Europe 2006)
2 
Two key conclusions emerge from these data. First, and most important, in every 
country the ideal family size exceeds the tempo-adjusted TFR which in turn 
exceeds the TFR. As discussed below, this finding has significant policy 
implications. Second, the IFS exceeds cohort fertility and the TFR falls short of 
cohort fertility in every country. In contrast, there is no systematic difference 
between cohort fertility and the adjusted TFR, and these two indicators are highly 
correlated. This finding confirms that the TFR in all 26 countries contains a 
downward distortion due to a rising age at child bearing and that the ATFR 
provides an approximate adjustment for this distortion. Further discussion of this 
issue can be found in Bongaarts and Feeney (1998, 2006). 
 
Figure 1: 
Total fertility, tempo adjusted total fertility and ideal family size for 26 European 
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Sources: Sobotka 2004, Goldstein et al. 2003, Council of Europe 2006. 
                                                 
2   The cohorts born around 1970 have not reached the end of their childbearing years by 2006. To 
estimate the completed fertility of these cohorts, Council of Europe (2006) assumes cohorts’ 
age-specific fertility for the unobserved remaining years of childbearing to equal the age-
specific rates observed in the last available year. John Bongaarts  45 
3  Why fertility indicators differ 
 
The finding that ideal family size exceeds current fertility as measured by the TFR 
is attributable to two general causes: 
1) Obstacles to achieving ideal family size. Three types of obstacles exist:  
•  Economic: the high cost of children, including the direct costs associated with 
the bearing and rearing of children and the opportunity costs of childbearing 
for working parents. Opportunity costs have increased over time with rising 
levels of women’s education and labour force participation. In addition, 
unemployment among young adults creates economic uncertainty and delays 
childbearing. 
•  Social: rising individualism, culturally defined gender roles, difficulty of 
finding a suitable partner, marital disruption (due to divorce or death of a 
spouse), differences between partner preferences, and a desire for a lifestyle 
or career that is incompatible with childbearing.  
•  Biological: the inability to conceive or carry a pregnancy to term. The risk of 
infertility rises with age and has become more prevalent in recent decades as 
childbearing has been postponed. Increasing numbers of women are “running 
out of time”.  
2) Tempo effects. As noted, the TFR is depressed whenever childbearing is being 
postponed. Figure 2 presents trends in the mean age at first birth for European 
countries, confirming that the age at first birth has risen over time in most 
countries. The tempo distortion of the TFR is directly proportional to the rates at 
  
Figure 2: 






































Sources: Council of Europe 2006, national statistical offices, and computations based on Eurostat 2008.  What can fertility indicators tell us about pronatalist policy options?  46 
which the mean ages at births of different orders are rising: an increase of 0.1 year 
per year in the mean age results in a 10% reduction in fertility and in a TFR that is 
10% lower than the ATFR (assuming the shape of the age pattern of fertility at 
each birth order to remain invariant over time). This reduction lasts as long as the 
mean age rises, but disappears instantly whenever the postponement in 
childbearing ends. Without the ongoing postponement of childbearing the TFR 
would be at the level estimated by the adjusted TFR. In most European countries 
the mean age at childbearing has risen for more than two decades and it is not 
clear when this trend along with its fertility-reducing effect will end.  
In addition to the obstacles and the tempo effect which depress the TFR 
relative to IFS, there are three other minor factors that have the opposite effect on 
the TFR: they raise fertility relative to ideal family size (Bongaarts 2001; Morgan 
2003): 
•  Unwanted fertility: Although contraception is widely practiced and abortion is 
generally available, some unwanted births occur as the result of either non-use 
or the use and failure of contraception and an unwillingness or inability to 
undergo an abortion. Estimates of unwanted fertility are not readily available 
for developed countries, except in the United States. A 2002 US survey found 
that 14 per cent of births in the five years before the survey were unwanted at 
the time of conception and a further 21 per cent were mistimed (Chandra et al. 
2005). Comparable estimates are not available for European countries, but the 
figures seem to be generally lower than in the US (Brown and Eisenberg 
1995; Régnier-Loilier and Leridon, 2007; Testa and Toulemon 2006). 
•  Replacement of deceased children. The replacement of a child that has died 
increases the number of births a couple has without changing the desired 
family size, which is therefore one of the reasons why the former might 
exceed the latter. Replacement can only have a small impact on fertility in 
developed societies because less than one per cent of children die as infants. 
In such cases even complete replacement would raise fertility by only about 
0.02 births per woman, which is small enough not to be of practical 
significance at the population level. 
•  Gender preferences: When stating a desired family size, respondents may 
have a specific gender composition in mind (e.g. one son and one daughter). 
In such cases parents may continue to have births after they have reached their 
desired number of children if their preferred gender composition has not been 
achieved. The existence of gender preferences can therefore lead to higher 
fertility than would be the case in their absence. While strong preferences for 
sons exist in a number of developing countries, gender preferences are 
generally weak in Europe. John Bongaarts  47 
4  Estimates of the obstacle and tempo effects 
Precise estimates of the separate roles of social, economic and biological 
obstacles are not possible due to a lack of detailed data. However, their 
approximate combined size can be deduced as follows. In a hypothetical 
population in which the three minor fertility-enhancing effects are absent, the 
total obstacle effect simply equals the difference between the IFS and the ATFR, 
because the removal of both the tempo effect and the obstacles would raise the 
TFR to the IFS. The difference between IFS and the ATFR averages 0.44 births 
per woman for the 13 countries for which estimates are available (this calculation 
assumes the IFS to be age-invariant and unaffected by the removal of various 
obstacles; this issue will not be pursued here for lack of data). Unfortunately, the 
fertility-enhancing factors are generally not negligible and the combined impact 
of the obstacles is therefore somewhat larger than suggested by this simple 
calculation. How much larger is unclear because there are hardly any estimates 
about the roles of unwanted fertility, gender preferences and replacement of 
deceased children but their joint impact is probably only a small fraction of one 
birth per woman in Europe, say on average around 0.1 or 0.2 births per woman. 
The total obstacle effect equals IFS minus ATFR plus this small enhancing factor. 
For the 13 European countries the average obstacle effect therefore equals around 
0.59 births per woman (i.e. 0.44 +0.15).  
Tempo effects can be estimated directly as the difference between observed 
and tempo-adjusted TFR. In the late 1990s the tempo distortion (ATFR-TFR) 
averaged 0.28 births per woman for the set of 26 countries listed in Table 1 (the 
average is 0.23 for subset of 13 countries).  
The sum of the tempo and obstacle effects is of interest to policy makers 
because, as illustrated below, these effects are potentially subject to policies that 
reduce their size and hence raise fertility. For the 13 countries for which estimates 
of all three indicators are available this sum equals 0.23 +0.59 for a total of about 
0.82 births per woman on average. If the average tempo effect of 0.28 births per 
woman for the 26 countries is used in this calculation the sum equals 0.28 +0.59 = 
0.87 births per woman. 
These averages provide a general magnitude of the factors causing differences 
between actual and preferred fertility in Europe in the late 1990s, but they hide 
substantial differences among countries. For example, the gap between the IFS 
and ATFR is less than 0.2 births per woman in Austria and West Germany, while 
it exceeds 0.6 in England and Wales, Finland and Greece. Country estimates of 
tempo effects range from less than 0.2 in France, West Germany, the Netherlands, 
England and Wales and Finland, to more than 0.4 births per woman in Italy, 
Estonia and Slovenia (see Table 1). These effect estimates for individual countries 
should be considered approximate because they contain measurement errors. 
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respect to the sizes of both obstacle and tempo effects. This in turn implies 
differences in the potential impact of any pronatalist policies. 
 
 
5  Policy options and their potential fertility impact 
Pronatalist policies are most likely to succeed if they focus on closing the gap 
between ideal and actual period fertility. This goal can be achieved in two general 
ways: 
1) Reduce obstacles  
In theory, policies could be designed to address all three types of obstacles—
economic, social and biological. However, most of the actual proposals that have 
been implemented or are under discussion focus on measures to reduce economic 
costs only. A wide range of options exists on this topic (McDonald 2002) and 
only a general comment will be made here. 
Economic incentives alone are likely to have only a modest impact on fertility 
for two reasons. First, the economic costs of childbearing and childrearing are 
large. For example, Longman (2004) estimates that the investment of US parents 
amounts to more than $1 million per child. Government contributions or tax 
breaks of a few thousand dollars a year or less can therefore have only a marginal 
effect on the decision to have a child. Second, the total effect of all obstacles on 
the  TFR is typically only around 0.6 births per woman. It is not possible to 
measure the separate contributions of economic, social and biological factors to 
this difference, but it is reasonable to assume that all three have some effect. The 
economic component alone might on average account for perhaps 0.2 or 0.3 births 
per woman. Of course, no actual policy can eliminate economic obstacles 
altogether so the actual effect is likely to be even smaller. Nevertheless, a well-
focused investment may have some impact. Indeed, countries in northern and 
western Europe with generous family support measures such as subsidised child 
care, reduced taxes for families with children and paid parental leaves have 
somewhat higher fertility than elsewhere in Europe. These observations about the 
potential impact of interventions are consistent with the conclusions of previous 
assessments which generally find modest effects for them (Caldwell et al. 2002; 
Calot 2006; Gauthier 2007; McDonald 2006) 
Much less attention has been paid to social obstacles. This is understandable 
as governments are reluctant to interfere with the individual decision making 
underlying these obstacles. An exception is the attempt made by governments in 
Japan and Singapore to raise  marriage rates among single women, since 
substantial proportions of women never marry and childbearing is largely 
confined to marriage in these societies. However, these efforts have apparently 
not yet been successful (McDonald 2006). 
Biological obstacles are real and growing due to the rising mean age at 
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interventions to assist women and couples who have difficulties in conceiving or 
carrying a pregnancy to term. This technology is expensive but increasingly 
effective. With a wider application of existing technology, involuntary primary 
and secondary infertility could be reduced further, thus raising the TFR by a small 
but significant amount. Toulemon (1996) estimates that 7 per cent of French 
women born between 1930 and 1950 were unable to have a child but that medical 
intervention addressed this problem for 2 per cent of couples. In recent decades 
the proportion of couples with infertility problems has risen further with women 
postponing childbearing, but the ability of medical intervention to reverse this 
obstacle has also improved. For example, Sobotka et al. (2008) estimate that up to 
7 per cent of children of native Danish women born in 1975 and later will likely 
be conceived by assisted reproductive technologies (ART). Further support for 
couples who have difficulties in reproducing and additional investment in 
biotechnology seem advisable and should be part of a comprehensive pronatalist 
policy. 
 
2) Reducing or eliminating tempo effects. 
As noted by Lutz and Skirbekk (2005), “population policies aimed at affecting 
the tempo of fertility are a new concept, and possibly a powerful and socially 
acceptable way to increase period fertility rates where these rates are considered 
to be too low” (p.715). Tempo policies are attractive because no major changes in 
behaviour are needed. Simply stopping the ongoing rise in the age at childbearing 
should result in an immediate rise of the TFR to the level of the ATFR as the 
tempo effect would disappear. For the 26 European countries listed in Table 1 
such a rise would average at 0.28 births per woman. This rise in fertility will be 
larger in countries with the most rapid rises in the ages at childbearing and hence 
the largest tempo effects. An even larger impact on the TFR could be achieved by 
reversing the long-term rise in the mean age at childbearing. For example, if a 
country could manage to turn around an upward trend of 0.1 years per year in the 
mean age at childbearing and initiate a slow decline of just 0.1 year per year, the 
period TFR would increase by 20 per cent (from 10 per cent below to 10 per cent 
above the ATFR). This effect will last as long as the mean age keeps declining. 
Furthermore, a reduction in the mean age at childbearing would have an indirect 
effect of raising the quantum of fertility because at younger ages the biological 
obstacle becomes smaller. According to Kohler et al. (2002) every year of decline 
in the timing of childbearing could raise completed fertility by a few per cent. 
The idea of tempo policies is relatively new and there has been little 
experience with them. Policies in Sweden and Austria favour a birth within 2 
years after a previous birth (Andersson 1999; Hoem et al. 2001). Lutz and 
Skirbekk (2005) propose reforms in the school system to lower the age at 
completion of education, thus potentially affecting the timing of childbearing. 
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trend towards postponement of childbearing. These and other ideas should be 
pursued more vigorously. 
 
 
6  Potential demographic impact of pronatalist policies  
The preceding analysis focused on options for raising fertility in low-fertility 
countries. However, higher fertility is not an end in itself, but rather a means to 
producing desirable demographic change. The dominant concern is population 
ageing that will occur if fertility remains at the current low levels. The question 
therefore is whether a small increase in fertility (of a few tenths of a birth per 
woman) that might be achieved by pronatalist policies does have a worthwhile 
impact on population ageing. 
To shed light on this issue, a set of three projections to 2050 of the old-age 
dependency ratio (population 15-64/population 65+) will be compared. These 
three projections, prepared by the United Nations (2007b), make identical 
assumptions about migration and mortality but differ in their assumptions about 
future fertility trends for Europe as a whole. The projections are as follows: 
1) Constant variant, leaves fertility at current low levels of 1.45 births per 
woman until 2050. This is slightly below the average of the 26 EU Member States 
in Table  1 because the UN includes all European countries in this aggregate 
projection. 
2) Medium variant, assumes a modest increase in fertility, reaching a TFR of 
1.76 births per woman in 2050. This scenario roughly expresses what would 
happen if tempo effects were to disappear over the next few decades.  
3) High variant, fertility 0.5 births per woman above the medium variant from 
2015 onwards. This scenario would raise the TFR to 2.26 in 2050 which is 
approximately the average IFS in Table  1. While vigorous implementation of 
pronatalist and tempo policies might close the gap between IFS and TFR, it seems 
unlikely that this gap will disappear entirely which is why this projection must be 
considered very difficult to achieve. 
Average TFRs for the entire projection period 2005-2050 equal 1.45, 1.61 and 
2.07 births per woman, respectively, for the three variants. On average, the 
medium variant therefore exceeds the constant variant by 0.16 births per woman 
and the high variant exceeds the medium variant by 0.46 births per woman.  
Figure 3 plots trends in the old-age dependency ratios for each of these 
projection variants. They are identical until 2020 because only after this date can 
a fertility decline initiated in 2005-2010 affect the population aged 15-64, and 
consequently the old-age dependency rate. As time progresses the impact of 
fertility changes on the old-age dependency ratio increases. By 2050 the old-age 
dependency ratio will rise by 114% (from 0.23 in 2005 to 0.50 in 2050) in the 
constant projection. This growth is slightly smaller (105 %) in the medium variant 
and substantially smaller (77%) in the high variant. Clearly, the dependency ratio John Bongaarts  51 
still rises over time even in the high variant, but there is a significant 
improvement over the constant variant. 
 
Figure 3: 





































Source: United Nations 2007 
 
Whether this reduction in the old-age dependency ratio is worth the 
investments required to implement pronatalist policies depends on the cost of 
alternative policies to address the growing burden of support and health care for 
ageing populations. This issue is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Figure 4 plots these projections of the old-age dependency rate in 2050 by 
region within Europe. The amount of ageing expected in the constant fertility 
projection between 2005 and 2050 varies considerably, mostly due to regional 
differences in fertility. The largest increases are projected for eastern and southern 
Europe (+135%) which are the regions with the lowest current fertility. In contrast 
the old-age dependency ratio is expected to grow by a more modest 78% in 
northern Europe and by 90% in western Europe where fertility is relatively high. 
The medium and high variant projections show the expected smaller increase in 
old-age dependency rates.  What can fertility indicators tell us about pronatalist policy options?  52 
Figure 4: 
Old age dependency ratio in 2005 and alternative projections for 2050 














Source: United Nations 2007 
 
 
7  Conclusion 
Growing concerns about the adverse implications of population ageing are 
stimulating interest in efforts to directly or indirectly encourage higher fertility. 
The preceding analysis of levels and differences in fertility indicators provides 
support for different types of pronatalist policies. In particular, the finding that 
ideal family size exceeds actual fertility greatly facilitates policy formulation. 
Effective efforts to close this gap should be welcomed by individuals who will be 
assisted in achieving their ideal family size and they should benefit society by 
increasing period fertility and thus reducing population ageing. 
The causes of this gap include economic, social and biological obstacles as 
well as tempo effects. The size of these factors varies substantially among 
countries but typical values are about 0.6 births per woman for the combined 
effect of the obstacles and about a quarter of one birth per woman for the tempo 
effect, resulting in a total average gap of around 0.8 to 0.9 births per woman. A 
comprehensive pronatalist policy should focus on all factors that cause actual 
fertility to be lower than the ideal level, not just economic ones. This means going 
beyond conventional economic measures that reduce the costs of childbearing and 
considering efforts to reduce biological and perhaps even social obstacles to 
childbearing. In addition, policies aimed at reducing or reversing the tempo 
distortion can have a substantial impact without requiring significant changes in 
behaviour.  John Bongaarts  53 
It appears that with a comprehensive policy and a substantial commitment of 
resources, fertility can be raised by a few tenths of a birth per woman above the 
level that would prevail without these policies. Effective tempo policies could 
result in even larger effects in the short run. Such effects would bring about a 
substantial reduction in the rise of the old-age dependency ratio by 2050, but 
would fall well short of halting population ageing. Nevertheless, the challenges 
posed by population ageing are so critical and so difficult to address that any step 
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